Waiting time and doctor shopping in a mixed medical economy

Raymond Y.T. Yeung, Gabriel M. Leung, Sarah M. McGhee and Janice M. Johnston

Health Economics, 2004, vol. 13, issue 11, 1137-1144

Abstract: Waiting time generally acts as a rationing mechanism in the public health care system. In theory, patients who have a higher valuation of time are more likely to seek alternative care (i.e. doctor shopping) if there is a parallel private sector than those who have weaker time preference. However, the existing settings of many health care systems do not allow patients to reveal their preference of such. The data presented in this study suggest a positive association between patients' expressed value of time and doctor shopping behaviour in Hong Kong. Patients who were assigned longer waiting times relative to their expected horizon were more likely to seek private alternative care. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:13:y:2004:i:11:p:1137-1144

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