The role of market discipline and macroprudential policies in achieving bank stability

Tiago Matos, João C. A. Teixeira and Tiago M. Dutra

International Journal of Finance & Economics, 2025, vol. 30, issue 3, 2085-2107

Abstract: This study examines whether forcing banks to hold subordinated debt and enforcing market discipline could enhance the effectiveness of capital macroprudential policies in reducing banks' risk and contribute to bank stability. Using the system generalised method of moments and based on a sample of 322 banks across 18 countries during the period 2006–2020, we find that a higher level of subordinated debt leads banks to avoid moral‐hazard behaviours and engage in risk shifting when adapting to a tighter macroprudential framework, which in turn leads to a greater effectiveness of these policies. Furthermore, as robustness tests, we show that this effect is stronger in advanced economies and in the United States of America. These results also stand using a different proxy for banks' risk.

Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/ijfe.3005

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:ijfiec:v:30:y:2025:i:3:p:2085-2107

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://jws-edcv.wile ... PRINT_ISSN=1076-9307

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Finance & Economics is currently edited by Mark P. Taylor, Keith Cuthbertson and Michael P. Dooley

More articles in International Journal of Finance & Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().