Joint ventures for entry deterrence

Shaoping Zhao
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Shaoping Zhao: The Richard Stockton College of New Jersey, Pomona, NJ, USA, Postal: The Richard Stockton College of New Jersey, Pomona, NJ, USA

Managerial and Decision Economics, 1999, vol. 20, issue 1, 25-35

Abstract: The literature of joint ventures has not discussed whether joint ventures may be used to deter entry. This paper then addresses how joint ventures may be used strategically for this purpose. Under the assumptions of linear demand and linear cost, as well as Stackelberg-Cournot interactions between incumbents and their joint venture firms, it is found that the incumbents can deter entry by creating independent joint ventures. Furthermore, it is shown that the optimal number of the joint ventures for the deterrence and the optimal deterrence strategies are functions of the number of potential entrants. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:1:p:25-35

DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1468(199902)20:1<25::AID-MDE915>3.0.CO;2-4

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