Proxy contest, board reelection, and managerial turnover-yes, the proxy contest outcome matters

Gili Yen and Ching-Lung Chen
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Gili Yen: Department of Business Administration, Chaoyang University of Technology, Taiwan, Postal: Department of Business Administration, Chaoyang University of Technology, Taiwan
Ching-Lung Chen: National Yunlin University of Science and Technology, Taiwan, Postal: National Yunlin University of Science and Technology, Taiwan

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2005, vol. 26, issue 1, 15-23

Abstract: In a previous study based on a matched sample analysis, it is found that in Taiwan top management turnover rate for the listed firms in the presence of a proxy contest is much higher than the ones without a proxy contest. In other words, the hypothesis of job security has gained empirical support. Taking account of the proxy contest outcomes, the present study extends the sample years, i.e. 1994-1999, to further examine the impact of proxy contest on managerial turnover. In conformity with expectations, the major empirical findings can be summarized as follows: the highest turnover rate of top management is observed in the firms of which the dissidents win majority seats; the second highest turnover rate is observed in the firms of which the dissidents win some seats; whereas the lowest turnover rate is observed in the firms of which the dissidents win no seats. Empirical findings of this kind provide further support to the view that proxy contest has played an effective monitoring role in disciplining incumbent management. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:1:p:15-23

DOI: 10.1002/mde.1186

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