When adding a fuel efficient car increases an automaker's CAFE penalty

Steven Tenn and John M. Yun
Additional contact information
Steven Tenn: Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC, USA, Postal: Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC, USA
John M. Yun: Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC, USA, Postal: Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC, USA

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2005, vol. 26, issue 1, 51-54

Abstract: We derive the conditions that cause an automaker's Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) fine to increase when it sells an additional, fuel efficient car. Raising the CAFE standards would broaden the range of fuel economies that produce this effect. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1206 Link to full text; subscription required (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:1:p:51-54

DOI: 10.1002/mde.1206

Access Statistics for this article

Managerial and Decision Economics is currently edited by Antony Dnes

More articles in Managerial and Decision Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().