Regulating a Manager‐controlled Natural Monopoly with Unknown Costs

Ismail Saglam

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2017, vol. 38, issue 6, 792-805

Abstract: We study the regulation of a manager‐controlled natural monopoly with unknown costs, borrowing from Baron and Myerson (BM) (1982), where the monopoly is controlled by the owner. We consider the case where the regulator can tax the owner as well as the case where she cannot. We find that the optimal price schedule generally lies below the one in the BM model and that it can be as low as the marginal cost if the compensation parameter is sufficiently small and the regulator cannot tax the monopoly owner. We also identify the cases where the monopoly owner prefers to delegate the control to a manager. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:38:y:2017:i:6:p:792-805

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