Exclusionary practices in two†sided markets: The effect of radius clauses on competition between shopping centers

Tim Brühn and Georg Götz
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Georg Götz

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2018, vol. 39, issue 5, 577-590

Abstract: We analyze exclusionary conduct of platforms in 2†sided markets. Motivated by recent antitrust cases, we provide a discussion of the likely positive and normative effects of exclusivity clauses, which prevent tenants from opening outlets in other shopping centers covered by the clause. In a standard 2†sided market model, we show that exclusivity agreements are especially profitable for the incumbent and detrimental to social welfare if competition is intense between the 2 shopping centers. We argue that the focus of courts on market definition is misplaced in markets determined by competitive bottlenecks.

Date: 2018
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2928

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:39:y:2018:i:5:p:577-590

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