Prisoner dilemma in a vertical duopoly with managerial delegation

Stefano Colombo ()

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2022, vol. 43, issue 5, 1476-1481

Abstract: We consider managerial delegation with two firms producing goods of different qualities. We show that both firms choose to delegate in equilibrium, but a prisoner dilemma is not inevitable in the case of Cournot competition. Indeed, when the quality asymmetry is sufficiently large, the profits of the high‐quality firm are greater than in the case of no delegation.

Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3468

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:43:y:2022:i:5:p:1476-1481

Access Statistics for this article

Managerial and Decision Economics is currently edited by Antony Dnes

More articles in Managerial and Decision Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().