Design of live broadcast service outsourcing contract considering risk aversion and financial constraints

Na Zhou, Ke Jia and Han Song

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2023, vol. 44, issue 2, 848-857

Abstract: Aiming at the problem of double information asymmetry in live broadcast service outsourcing, firstly, using the principal‐agent theory, we design an incentive contract based on the live broadcast time and revenue sharing payment. Then, we further consider the risk aversion of the live broadcast company, and study the design of the live broadcast service outsourcing contract when the live broadcast company considers the risk of uncertain sales and has financial constraints. The optimal contract and its influencing factors under double information asymmetry are analyzed. Finally, the relevant conclusions are verified by numerical examples, and management implications are summarized.

Date: 2023
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3716

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:44:y:2023:i:2:p:848-857

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