Release Strategy of Competing Retailers for Reserved Produce Under the Government's Emergency Reserves With Order Constraints

Ting Lei, Bin Dan, Yongqi Yuan, Yu Tian and Yu Ding

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2025, vol. 46, issue 4, 2524-2539

Abstract: The government establishes an emergency reserve system and releases reserved produce through competing retailers in a fresh produce supply chain. We study the release strategy of competing retailers for reserved produce under the government's emergency reserves with order constraints. Our results reveal that competing retailers are willing to release reserved produce despite intensifying market competition. The release of reserved produce does not necessarily cannibalize supplies of fresh produce; however, the order constraints on reserved produce may instead reduce fresh produce supplies. It can also simultaneously improve or reduce supply chain performance and consumer surplus, bringing a “win‐win” or “lose‐lose” situation.

Date: 2025
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4479

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:46:y:2025:i:4:p:2524-2539

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