Is Blockchain Really Good for E‐Platform? A Double‐Edged Sword From Consumer Trust and Channel Cannibalization

Xiaoxi Zhu, Yu Chen, Minglun Ren and Wei Chu

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2025, vol. 46, issue 4, 2562-2582

Abstract: The application of blockchain technology in e‐platforms makes products more reliable and traceable, especially products from third‐party retailers without brand authorization. However, this technology will also intensify the competition between authorized retailers and third‐party retailers. On the other hand, as intermediaries, e‐platforms' profits have also become elusive. We aim to investigate how blockchain technology impacts optimal pricing strategies and profit distribution in a dual‐channel supply chain composed of one manufacturer, one e‐platform, and two e‐tailers. By adopting a Stackelberg game framework, the results show that (1) the e‐platforms may not necessarily benefit from blockchain; only when the commission rate and unit usage cost are both small (or large) enough can the platform achieve higher profit. (2) The application of blockchain can yield extra reputation benefits for third‐party retailer, while the retail prices of both channels may also be higher. (3) The Pareto improvements show that when manufacturer sells products to official retailer and third‐party retailer at different prices, the possibility of successful blockchain implementation increases. (4) When the third‐party retailer shares blockchain usage cost, its optimal channel price rises and demand decreases. For the official retailer, changes in pricing depend on competitive intensity. The manufacturer tends to reduce wholesale price under the strategy, benefiting both e‐tailers and enhancing product competitiveness and supply chain efficiency.

Date: 2025
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4482

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