Property Crime, Recidivism, and Household Behavior

Sridhar Telidevara

Poverty & Public Policy, 2012, vol. 4, issue 3, 99-130

Abstract: This paper presents a model of strategic interaction between households and recidivists who commit property crimes. It is estimated that the households pay an income tax rate between 0.12 and 0.21 percent for protection from a loss of 1.8 to 2.25 percent of their annual incomes. Thirteen to 22 percent of total funding for public enforcement is devoted to detecting property crime. The minimum acceptable payoff to a property crime opportunity for the city of Buffalo, New York, is estimated to be between $325 and $400. The expected disutility from punishment for a crime is eight to nine times the minimum acceptable payoff. The model is useful in determining the elasticity of the income tax rate with respect to several important policy parameters.

Date: 2012
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https://doi.org/10.1002/pop4.8

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:povpop:v:4:y:2012:i:3:p:99-130

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