Deceptive choice architecture and behavioral audits: A principles‐based approach

Stuart Mills

Regulation & Governance, 2024, vol. 18, issue 4, 1426-1441

Abstract: Regulators are increasingly concerned about deceptive, online choice architecture, including dark patterns and behavioral sludge. From a behavioral science perspective, fostering a regulatory environment which reduces the economic harm caused by deceptive designs, while safeguarding the benefits of well‐meaning behavioral insights, is essential. This article argues for a principles‐based approach and proposes behavioral audits as a tool to support this approach.

Date: 2024
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https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12590

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:reggov:v:18:y:2024:i:4:p:1426-1441

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