Public disclosure in acquisitions

Avanidhar Subrahmanyam and Wenyuan Xu

Review of Financial Economics, 2018, vol. 36, issue 1, 3-11

Abstract: This paper analyzes firms’ optimal choice of information disclosure before an acquisition. The intuition is that value‐maximizing firms face the following tradeoffs. First, a more precise disclosure reduces risk premia. Second, too precise a disclosure that allows targets to profit increases the price paid for the target in an acquisition. The main conclusion is that firm chooses to disclose either all information or the minimum information required by the regulators, depending on the disclosure requirements, investors’ risk aversion, and the uncertainty embedded in technology shocks.

Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/rfe.1017

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:revfec:v:36:y:2018:i:1:p:3-11

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Review of Financial Economics from John Wiley & Sons
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().