Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies

Harold Cole, George Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite

CARESS Working Papres from University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences

Abstract: Do investors making complementary investments face the correct incentives, especially when they cannot contract with each other prior to their decisions? We present a two-sided matching model in which buyers and sellers make investments prior to matching. Once matched, buyer and seller bargain over the price, taking into account outside options. Efficient decisions can always be sustained in equilibrium. We characterize the inefficiencies that can arise in equilibrium, and show that equilibria will be constrained efficient. We also show that the degree of diversity in a large market has implications for the extent of any inefficiency.

Date: 2000-06-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~gmailath/wpapers/eff-inv-large.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies (2001)
Working Paper: Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies
Working Paper: Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wop:pennca:eff-inv-large

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