Market Selection and Asymmetric Information

George Mailath and Alvaro Sandroni

CARESS Working Papres from University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences

Abstract: Do investors making complementary investments face the correct incentives, especially when they cannot contract with each other prior to their decisions? We present a two-sided matching model in which buyers and sellers make investments prior to matching. Once matched, buyer and seller bargain over the price, taking into account outside options. Efficient decisions can always be sustained in equilibrium. We characterize the inefficiencies that can arise in equilibrium, and show that equilibria will be constrained efficient. We also show that the degree of diversity in a large market has implications for the extent of any inefficiency.

Date: 2000-06-14
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http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~gmailath/wpapers/mkt-caress.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Market Selection and Asymmetric Information (2003)
Working Paper: Market Selection and Asymmetric Information
Working Paper: Market Selection and Asymmetrick Information
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wop:pennca:mkt-selection

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