Interconnection and Rivalry between Banks

John Weinberg

Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers from Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: This is an incomplete draft of a paper that will examine the competitive tension that arises when banks which compete for deposits provide "interconnecting" payment services to each other's depositors. This draft presents a basic theoretical model and discusses some of the analysis that can be carried out and issues that can be addressed with the model.

Date: 1999-08
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wop:pennin:00-15

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