Stakeholders, Bargaining and Strikes

Paola Manzini and Clara Ponsati

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We study bilateral bargaining problems with interested third parties, the stakeholders that enjoy benefits upon a bilateral agreement. We explore the strategic implications of this third party involvement. Our main finding is that the potential willigness of the stake holders to make contributions to promote agreement may be the source of severe inefficiency. However, and more surprisingly, for a wide range of parameter values this outcome is better for the stakeholder than if he enters bargaining directly. Our results lend support to the tendency towards decentralisation of pay bargaining in the public sector in Europe.

Keywords: bargaining; public sector; stakeholders; strikes; labour relations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2001-12-06
Note: Type of Document - WordPerfect; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP; pages: 38
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Stakeholders, Bargaining and Strikes (2010)
Working Paper: Stakeholders, Bargaining and Strikes (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0112001

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