Stable Coalitions in Monotonic Games

Joseph Mullat ()

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: A formal scheme is described for coalition formation in a game of interconnected participants with monotonic utility functions. Special coalitions are studied which have an advantage over the rest in the sense of higher utility for each of the participants taken separately.

Keywords: coalition; game; utility; monotonic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-12-21, Revised 2005-09-13
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0112003

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