How vague can one be? Rational preferences without completeness or transitivity

Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: What can it mean for preferences to be rational when transitivity or completenss are not assumed? In this paper we provide a framework and a set of conditions to deal with this question. We provide representation results in terms of a pair of functions, a utility function and a vagueness function.

Keywords: incomplete preferences; vagueness; sure-thing principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-12-12, Revised 2004-07-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe
Note: Type of Document - ; prepared on WinNT; to print on laser;
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/game/papers/0312/0312006.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0312006

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).