Efficiency Does Not Imply Immediate Agreement

Sergiu Hart and Zohar Levy
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Zohar Levy: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Gul (Econometrica, 1989) introduces a non-cooperative bargaining procedure and claims that the payoffs of the resulting efficient stationary subgame perfect equilibria are close to the Shapley value of the underlying transferable utility game (when the discount factor is close to 1). We exhibit here an example showing that efficiency, even for strictly super-additive games, does not imply that all meetings end in agreement. Thus efficiency does not suffice to get Gul's result.

JEL-codes: C71 C72 D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-09-28
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Journal Article: Efficiency Does Not Imply Immediate Agreement (1999)
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