A Model of Bargaining with the Possibility of Arbitration

Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We consider an alternating offer bargaining model in which the players may agree to call in an arbitrator in case of disagreement. The main message of our study is that the mere presence of an arbitrator - who can only become active with the consent of both parties - in the background of negotiations may entirely drive their outcome. We discuss the implications of this result both for theories of arbitration and for the interpretation of cooperative bargainining solutions.

Keywords: bargaining; arbitration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 1997-10-01
Note: Type of Document - ScientificWord2.5; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP; pages: 36; figures: included
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: A Model of Bargaining with the Possibility of Arbitration (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9710001

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