Why do capital intensive companies pay higher wages?

Matti Virén
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Matti Virén: Bank of Finland

Labor and Demography from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: An obvious answer to this question is the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis originally proposed by Zwi Griliches (1969). But the relatively poor performance of this hypothesis suggests that other explanations are needed. Here we consider the labour union behaviour in the wage bargaining process as such an alternative. The explanation is based on the observation that capital intensive companies are more vulnerable to strike threats and may thus more easily give in for union wage demand. Thus, the bargaining power of unions is related to the capital-labour ratio. This paper provides some tests for these hypotheses with panel data for Finnish companies. The results give support to the wage bargaining hypothesis.

Keywords: wages; bargaining; wage distribution; panel data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2005-08-31
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 27. Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 5/2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpla:0508014

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