Book Review---Privatising Power Cuts? Ownership and Reform of State Electricity Boards in India
Deepak Kumar and
P Nair
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Deepak Kumar: ICFAI University Press
P Nair: ICFAI University
Law and Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
This book discusses the functioning of the State Electricity Boards (commonly known as SEBs) of India and the implications of the new liberalized approach. It argues that these institutions have always been effectively under the thumb of the government, no matter what the cosmetic dressing. The real power has always vested with someone who has been appointed by the concerning state government. The book traces the history of the state electricity boards and goes into operational details such as the manpower configurations, thefts, Transmission and Distribution losses (T&D) and other technical aspects. It argues for a re-energization of these institutions and provides a few solutions as to how this can be done. It offers insights into this most complex issue, which must be eventually solved, one way or the other, if the power sector is really to take off and investments from the private sector and multilateral agencies are to be encouraged.
Keywords: State; Electricity; Boards; in; India (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6 pages
Date: 2005-06-04
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 6. State Electricity Boards in India
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0506002
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