Un modelo de decisión judicial previsional argentino

Carlos Salomón
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Carlos Salomón: Universidad de San Andrés

Microeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Following the separation of powers' models, this paper analyzes the behaviour of the Supreme Court in the Social Security's case Rolon Zappa (1986). Besides judicial independence, I suppose that the economic, social and legal conditions of the case influence the utility of the judges. I develop a game between five players: the Supreme Court, the Social Security Administration, the pensioner, the Executive and the Congress. As a result, the Court, at least in this particular case, acted strategically; had a long run horizont and did not take into account the macroeconomic and social context of that period.

Keywords: judicial game; separation of powers models; supreme court behaviour (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2005-11-05, Revised 2006-04-02
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 30. Es un juego entre cuatro
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0511001

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