Can Voting Reduce Welfare? Evidence from the US Telecommunications Sector

Dino Falaschetti
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Dino Falaschetti: Montana State University

Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Voter turnout is frequently cited as gauging a polity's health. The ease with which electoral members produce political support can, however, retard an economy's productive capacity. For example, while mobile electorates might efficaciously monitor political agents, they may also lack credibility when committing to regulatory policies. Consequently, a "healthy" polity's economy can rest at an inferior discretionary equilibrium. I develop evidence that the US telecommunications sector may indeed have realized such an outcome. This evidence is remarkably difficult to dismiss as an artifact of endogeneity bias.

Keywords: Electoral Institutions; Voter Turnout; Distributive Policy; Regulatory Commitment; Telecommunications Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-01-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-com and nep-pol
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on Windows
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0401009

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