Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Capacity

Sean Gailmard and John W. Patty
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Sean Gailmard: Northwestern University
John W. Patty: Carnegie Mellon University

Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper we investigate how “civil service” personnel management interacts with bureaucratic discretion to create high capacity, expert bureaucracies populated by policy-motivated agents. We build a model in which bureaucrats may invest in (relationship specific) policy expertise, and may be either policy-motivated or policy-indifferent. We show that under specific conditions on the nature of expertise and bureaucratic discretion over policy choices, merit system protections for job tenure encourage the development of expertise and problem solving capacity in the bureaucracy. In addition, we identify conditions under which typical civil service rules encourage policy-motivated bureaucrats to enter and remain in public service, and policy- indifferent bureaucrats to leave it.

Keywords: Bureaucracy; Expertise; Discretion; Civil Service (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D72 D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2005-02-16
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 29
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0502008

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