Whose Ear (or Arm) to Bend? Information Sources and Venue Choice in Policy Making

Frederick J. Boehmke, Sean Gailmard and John W. Patty
Additional contact information
Frederick J. Boehmke: University of Iowa
Sean Gailmard: Northwestern University
John W. Patty: Carnegie Mellon University

Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Important conceptualizations of both interest groups and bureaucratic agencies suggest that these institutions provide legislatures with greater information for use in policy making. Yet little is known about how these information sources interact in the policy process as a whole. In this paper we consider this issue analytically, and develop a model of policy making in which multiple sources of information – from the bureaucracy, an interest group, or a legislature’s own in-house development – can be brought to bear on policy. Lobbyists begin this process by selecting a venue – Congress or a standing bureaucracy – in which to press for a policy change. The main findings of the paper are that self-selection of lobbyists into different policy making venues can be informative per se; that this self-selection can make legislatures willing to delegate more authority to ideologically distinct bureaucratic agents; and that delegation of authority, while it takes advantage of agency expertise, can nevertheless lead to an increase in the legislature’s own in-house information gathering (e.g., hearings). Changes within the Federal Trade Commission during the 1970s are reinterpreted in the context of our model.

Keywords: Delegation; Lobbying; Bureaucracy; Venue Choice; Discretion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D72 D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2005-02-16
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 31
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0502009

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