Historical Self-Governance and Norms of Cooperation
Devesh Rustagi
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Abstract:
Does self-governance, a hallmark of democratic societies, foster norms of generalized cooperation? Does this effect persist, and if so, why? I investigate these questions using a natural experiment in Switzerland. In the middle-ages, the absence of an heir resulted in the extinction of a prominent noble dynasty. As a result, some Swiss municipalities became self-governing, whereas the others remained under feudalism for another 600 years. Evidence from a behavioral experiment, World Values Survey, and Swiss Household Panel consistently shows that individuals from historically self-governing municipalities exhibit stronger norms of cooperation today. Referenda data on voter-turnout allow me to trace these effects on individually costly and socially beneficial actions for over 150 years. Furthermore, norms of cooperation map into prosocial behaviors like charitable giving and environmental protection. Uniquely, Switzerland tracks every family’s place of origin in registration data, which I use to demonstrate persistence from cultural transmission in a context of historically low migration.
Keywords: Self-governance; norms of cooperation; cultural transmission; public goods game; referendum; Switzerland JEL Codes: D02; H41; N43; Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-his and nep-soc
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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/w ... p_1510_-_rustagi.pdf
Related works:
Journal Article: Historical Self‐Governance and Norms of Cooperation (2024)
Working Paper: Historical Self-Governance and Norms of Cooperation (2024)
Working Paper: Historical Self-Governance and Norms of Cooperation (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:1510
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