Anticipation of Discrimination, Misperceptions, and Trust: Application to Affective Polarization
Devesh Rustagi and
Matthias Schief
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Matthias Schief: OECD
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Abstract:
Does anticipation of discrimination, beliefs individuals have about the discriminatory behavior of others toward them, undermine trust and cooperation? We develop a new design to isolate the role of anticipation of discrimination in cooperation dilemmas using a trust game. We capture the effect of anticipation on trust as the double di erence between the amount transferred by trustors to outgroup vs. ingroup trustees when their own identity is revealed vs. concealed. We apply our design in the context of a ective polarization in the UK using a large representative sample. We nd that anticipation of discrimination undermines inter-partisan trust and cooperation by the same magnitude as the combined e ect of taste-based and statistical discrimination. However, this anticipation is misperceived because trustees rarely discriminate along partisan lines, resulting in cooperation failure. Our design can be used to study anticipation of discrimination across di erent societal divisions including gender, et hnicity, religion, and caste. JEL Codes: C91 ; C93 ; J15 ; D72 ; Z13
Keywords: discrimination; anticipation; misperception; trust game; cooperation dilemma; affective polarization; United Kingdom (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/w ... rp_1535-_rustagi.pdf
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Working Paper: Anticipation of Discrimination, Misperceptions, and Trust: Application to Affective Polarization (2024) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:1535
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