The Normalization of the Far-Right: When the Salience of Victories Matters
Margot Belguise
Additional contact information
Margot Belguise: University of Warwick
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Abstract:
Far-right voting is stigmatized, yet rising worldwide. Do signals of the far-right’s popularity embolden voters to support it, even in the secrecy of the voting booth? I exploit quasiexperimental variation from the French two-round electoral system. When far-right candidates narrowly win round one—a purely symbolic victory—this brings them more votes in round two, held merely one week later. Evidence aligns with voters attending more to salient signals when they update beliefs about stigma strength. As predicted if voters attach greater weight to more salient signals, more unusual wins have larger effects. Leveraging a large corpus of newspaper articles I scraped, I show that these narrow wins attract media attention, which predicts the vote effect. Consistent with stigma erosion, this effect is specific to the far-right, larger where stigma is likely stronger, and persists in the next election. Using administrative records on campaign funding, I document similar patterns for campaign donations—acts of support that are less secret than votes and may therefore carry larger reputational costs. JEL Codes: P00 ; D72 ; D91
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/w ... p_1587-_belguise.pdf
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:1587
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Margaret Nash ().