Power Relations in the International Monetary Fund: A Study of the Political Economy of a Priori Voting Power Using the Theory of Simple Games

Dennis Leech

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: In general in organizations whose system of governance involves weighted majority voting, power and voting weight differ. Power indices are a value concept for majority voting games which provide a means of analyzing this difference. This paper provides new algorithms for computing the two classical power indices (the Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index) and applies them to the voting distribution in the two governing bodies of the IMF each year since its foundation.

Keywords: VOTING; GAMES; ELECTIONS; IMF (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 F0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:494

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