Time-Inconsistent Candidates vs. Time-Inconsistent Voters: Imperfect Policy Commitment in Political Equilibrium

Marco Pani and Carlo Perroni
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Marco Pani: International Monetary Fund

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines whether policy commitment mechanisms, when available, will be used by the elected policymaker in a political-economy equilibrium. We describe a two period repeated voting model where second-period outcomes depend on commitment choices made by an elected policymaker in the first period, and where elected candidates may choose to deviate from their preferred level of commitment, retaining discretionary control of policy variables, in order to secure a favourable second-period political outcome. The implications of different political tenure systems for the candidates who are elected, the policy targets that are selected, the degree of commitment to their implementation, and the policies that are actually implemented in the model are examined.

Keywords: Dynamically Consistent Choices; Policy Commitment; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 D9 H1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 1999
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/t544.pdf

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Working Paper: Time-Inconsistent Candidates vs. Time-Inconsistent Voters: Imperfect Policy Commitment in Political Equilibrium (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:544

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