An Empirical Comparison of the Performance of Classical Power Indices

Dennis Leech

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper assesses the indices against a set of reasonable criteria in terms of shareholder voting power and the control of the corporation in a large cross section of British companies. Each company is a separate voting body and there is much variation in the distribution of voting shares among them. Moreover reasonable criteria exist against which to judge the indices. New algorithms for the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices are applied to detailed data on beneficial ownership of 444 large UK companies without majority control.

Keywords: INDEXES; GAMES; VOTING; SHAREHOLDERS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: An Empirical Comparison of the Performance of Classical Power Indices (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:563

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