Renegotiation of Social Contracts by Majority Rule

Dan Anderberg and Carlo Perroni

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider renegotiation of social earnings insurance arrangements by majority voting in an economy where ex-ante identical individuals make unobservable private investments in education. We show that voting-based renegotiation can result in a higher expected level of investment in comparison to the case where social insurance is determined by an appointed social planner.

Keywords: INSURANCE; EDUCATION; INCOME; VOTING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 H2 J2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/twerp566.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Renegotiation of Social Contracts by Majority Rule (2000)
Working Paper: Renegotiation of Social Contracts by Majority Rule
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:566

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Margaret Nash ().