Persuasion in Networks

Francesco Squintani
Additional contact information
Francesco Squintani: University of Warwick

CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series from Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA

Abstract: This paper explores the intersection of two major research streams in economic theory : information transmission in networks and strategic communication. The model embeds Milgrom’s (1981) strategic disclosure game into the communication network framework of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). I find that the uniquely optimal network is a line in which players are ordered by their bliss points. This ordered line is also pairwise-stable. This finding contrasts with previous results in network studies, which identify stars as the optimal and pairwise-stable networks when communication is non-strategic and subject to technological constraints. While stars are the most centralized minimally connected networks, the line is the most decentralized.

Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/c ... ncesco_squintani.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:wcreta:88

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series from Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Margaret Nash ().