Persuasion in Networks

Francesco Squintani
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Francesco Squintani: University of Warwick

CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series from Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA

Abstract: I study strategic transmission of verifiable information through intermediaries, and find that equilibrium full disclosure requires that all players are biased in the same direction relative to the decision maker. By embedding this strategic disclosure game into networks, I explore the intersection of information transmission in networks and strategic communication—two major economic theory research strands. When each networked player may hold information useful for any other’s decision, I find that the unique ex-ante optimal network is a line where players are ordered by their bliss points. This is also the unique network immune to coalitional deviations.

Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
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