The Choice of Political Advisors

Dimitri Migrow, Hyungmin Park and Francesco Squintani
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Dimitri Migrow: University of Edinburgh
Hyungmin Park: University of Warwick
Francesco Squintani: University of Warwick

QAPEC Discussion Papers from Quantitative and Analytical Political Economy Research Centre

Abstract: We study a leader’s choice of advisors, balancing political alignment, informational competence, and diversity of views. The leader can consult one or two advisors : one is politically aligned but less informed or shares potentially redundant information; the other is better informed but more biased. The leader’s optimal strategy can exhibit reversals. If both advisors are initially consulted, increasing the bias of the more biased advisor may cause the leader to exclude the aligned advisor to preserve truthfulness from the informed one. As bias rises further, the leader ultimately replaces the informed advisor if his bias becomes too large. When the leader is uncertain about the bias of the more informed advisor, increasing the chance of alignment can justify consulting both advisors.

Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-inv and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:wqapec:29

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