PAYOFF-BASED PROBABILISTIC INTERACTION MODEL ON THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION IN SPATIAL PUBLIC GOODS GAME

Yajie Liu, Jinlong Ma, Xiangyang Xu and Yuping Li ()
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Yajie Liu: School of Information Science and Engineering, Hebei University of Science and Technology, Shijiazhuang 050018, P. R. China2Hebei Technology Innovation Center of Intelligent IoT, Shijiazhuang 050018, P. R. China
Jinlong Ma: School of Information Science and Engineering, Hebei University of Science and Technology, Shijiazhuang 050018, P. R. China2Hebei Technology Innovation Center of Intelligent IoT, Shijiazhuang 050018, P. R. China
Xiangyang Xu: School of Information Science and Engineering, Hebei University of Science and Technology, Shijiazhuang 050018, P. R. China2Hebei Technology Innovation Center of Intelligent IoT, Shijiazhuang 050018, P. R. China
Yuping Li: Shijiazhuang University, Shijiazhuang 050035, P. R. China

Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), 2024, vol. 27, issue 07n08, 1-19

Abstract: In the spatial public goods game (SPGG), punishment effectively promotes cooperation but often reduces the collective benefits of cooperators and punishers. In order to increase revenue, we propose a probabilistic interaction domain model considering both strategy type and payoff level. In this model, players are divided into two types, successful players with payoffs higher than the payoff threshold and failed players with payoffs lower than the payoff threshold. A successful player is less likely to change the interaction range than a failed player. Through extensive simulations, it is shown to verify that a higher payoff threshold leads to a more pronounced promotion effect on cooperation and corresponds to a higher cooperation return. Moreover, introducing dynamic interaction domain can rapidly remove defectors from the vicinity of cooperative players on regular lattices. Reducing the payoff gap between punishers and cooperators helps mitigate the system’s second-order free-riding problem. Additionally, through analysis of the critical parameters, it is revised that incorporating diversity in interaction structures substantively enhances cooperation level.

Keywords: The spatial public goods game; interaction domain; regular lattices; payoff threshold; cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219525924500085

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