Carbon Emission Reduction Decisions of Supply Chain Differential Game Under Different Government Intervention Models

Yuxin Shu (), Han Song, Ying Dai, Jinchai Lin and Nali Shen ()
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Yuxin Shu: School of Economics and Management, Fuzhou University Fujian, Fuzhou 350108, P. R. China
Han Song: School of Management Chongqing, University of Technology Chongqing 400054, P. R. China3Green Supply Chain Innovation, Research Center of CQUT Chongqing University of Technology, Chongqing 400054, P. R. China
Ying Dai: School of Management Chongqing, University of Technology Chongqing 400054, P. R. China3Green Supply Chain Innovation, Research Center of CQUT Chongqing University of Technology, Chongqing 400054, P. R. China
Jinchai Lin: School of Management Chongqing, University of Technology Chongqing 400054, P. R. China3Green Supply Chain Innovation, Research Center of CQUT Chongqing University of Technology, Chongqing 400054, P. R. China
Nali Shen: Business School Southwest University of Political, Science & Law Chongqing 401120, P. R. China

Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (APJOR), 2025, vol. 42, issue 04, 1-49

Abstract: The environmental deterioration caused by carbon emissions has enhanced people’s awareness of environmental protection. Governments, businesses and consumers are expected to reduce carbon emissions while ensuring their daily activities. Therefore, based on the background of carbon emission reduction, this paper explores the impact of different low-carbon subsidy methods of government on supply chain decision-making. Through analysis and solutions, the main research conclusions are as follows: the government’s subsidy model will not affect the retailer’s low-carbon publicity level and the manufacturer’s cost-sharing rate. However, the government subsidy coefficient will affect the carbon emission reduction level, carbon emission reduction yield, low-carbon goodwill, the manufacturer’s profit and the retailer’s profit. If the manufacturer and the retailer aim only to maximize profits, the government subsidies based on carbon emission reduction yield will not be the optimal choice, which is mainly because the government only considers carbon emission reduction yield and not carbon emission reduction cost. On the contrary, if both take into account carbon emission reduction, the government subsidy to consumers will not be the optimal choice. Finally, according to the analysis and discussion, we can get some management enlightenment and suggestions.

Keywords: Carbon emission reduction; government intervention; differential game; supply chain management; strategy choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1142/S0217595924500246

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