NASH EQUILIBRIA FROM THE CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA VIEWPOINT
Sabrina Gomez Canovas (),
Pierre Hansen () and
Brigitte Jaumard ()
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Sabrina Gomez Canovas: École Polytechnique de Montréal, Département de Mathématiques et de Génie Industriel, Succursale Centre Ville CP 6079, Canada, H3C 3A7, Canada
Pierre Hansen: GERAD & Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, Département des Méthodes Quantitatives en Gestion, 3000 chemin de la Côte Sainte Catherine, Montréal, Canada, H3T 2A7, Canada
Brigitte Jaumard: GERAD & École Polytechnique de Montréal, Département de Mathématiques et de Génie Industriel, Succursale Centre Ville CP 6079, Canada, H3C 3A7, Canada
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 1999, vol. 01, issue 01, 33-44
Abstract:
We consider Nash equilibria as correlated equilibria and apply polyhedral theory to study extreme Nash equilibrium properties. We obtain an alternate proof that extreme Nash equilibria are extreme correlated equilibria and give some characteristics of them. Furthermore, we study a class of games that have no completely mixed Nash equilibria.
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:01:y:1999:i:01:n:s0219198999000049
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198999000049
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