NASH EQUILIBRIA IN LOAD BALANCING IN DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS

Eitan Altman (), Hisao Kameda () and Yoshihisa Hosokawa ()
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Eitan Altman: INRIA B.P. 93, 06902 Sophia Antipolis Cedex, France;
Hisao Kameda: The Institute of Information Sciences and Electronics, University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba Science City, Ibaraki 305-8573, Japan
Yoshihisa Hosokawa: Graduate School of Systems and Information Engineering, University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba Science City, Ibaraki 305-8573, Japan

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2002, vol. 04, issue 02, 91-100

Abstract: The use of game theoretical techniques has been quite successful in describing routing in networks, both in road traffic applications as well as in telecommunication networks applications. We study in this paper a third area of applications of such games, which is load balancing in distributed computer systems. One of the most important questions that arise in all applications of routing games is the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. Whereas the existence of Nash equilibrium is known for general models of networks under weak assumptions, uniqueness results are only known for very special applications, i.e., either for very special cost functions or for very special topologies. We establish in this paper the uniqueness of an equilibrium for routing games with topologies that model well distributed computer systems, under quite general assumptions on the costs.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; distributed computing; uniqueness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198902000574

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