A Two-Person Conflict Model in Train Scheduling

Keivan Ghoseiri, Ferenc Szidarovszky () and Mohammad Jawad Asgharpour
Additional contact information
Keivan Ghoseiri: Department of Systems and Industrial Engineering, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, 85721-0020, U.S.A.;
Ferenc Szidarovszky: Department of Systems and Industrial Engineering, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, 85721-0020, U.S.A.
Mohammad Jawad Asgharpour: Department of Industrial Engineering, Iran University of Science and Technology, Tehran, Iran

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2003, vol. 05, issue 02, 105-125

Abstract: This paper presents a two-person bargaining model in which railway company and its passenger community are the players in the train-scheduling problem. The fuel consumption cost and the total passenger-time constitute the payoff functions. First, the Pareto frontier is determined using the ∊-constraint method and then conflict resolution is performed using five particular resolution methodologies, namely the non-symmetric Nash solution, the non-symmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, the non-symmetric area monotonic solution, the non-symmetric equal loss solution, and a one-shot solution concept. A numerical example is presented to illustrate the methodology.

Keywords: Conflict resolution; bargaining; train scheduling; Pareto frontier; non-symmetric Nash solution; Kalai-Smorodinsky solution; area monotonic solution; equal loss solution; one-shot solution concept (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198903000921
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:05:y:2003:i:02:n:s0219198903000921

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198903000921

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().