CONTINUOUS FEEDBACK CONTROL STRATEGY WITH MAXIMAL CAPTURE ZONE IN A CLASS OF PURSUIT GAMES

Vladimir Turetsky () and Valery Y. Glizer ()
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Vladimir Turetsky: Faculty of Aerospace Engineering, Technion, Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, 32000, Israel
Valery Y. Glizer: Faculty of Aerospace Engineering, Technion, Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, 32000, Israel

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2005, vol. 07, issue 01, 1-24

Abstract: An interception problem of a highly maneuverable target is considered using a linearized kinematical model with first order acceleration dynamics of the interceptor and the target. The problem is interpreted as a differential game of pursuit. An admissible pursuer (interceptor) feedback strategy, continuous with respect to the state variables and having a maximal capture zone, is constructed. This strategy is the saturated version of a linear feedback control, obtained from the solution of an auxiliary linear-quadratic differential game with cheap controls. This strategy is evaluated by Monte-Carlo simulation of the interception with noisy measurements.

Keywords: Interception problem; differential game of pursuit; maximal capture zone; saturation; continuous feedback control; chattering; Subject Classification: 91A24 (49N75); Subject Classification: 91A23 (49N70) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198905000375

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