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ON BARGAINING BASED POINT SOLUTION TO COOPERATIVE TU GAMES

V. Thangaraj (), A. Sugumaran and Amit K. Biswas
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V. Thangaraj: Ramanujan Institute for Advanced Study in Mathematics, University of Madras, Chennai — 600 005, India
A. Sugumaran: Ramanujan Institute for Advanced Study in Mathematics, University of Madras, Chennai — 600 005, India
Amit K. Biswas: Indian Statistical Institute, Nelson Manickam Road, Chennai 600 029, Chennai

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2007, vol. 09, issue 02, 361-374

Abstract: Consider the cooperative coalition games with side payments. Bargaining sets are calculated for all possible coalition structures to obtain a collection of imputations rather than single imputation. Our aim is to obtain a single payoff vector, which is acceptable by all players of the game under grand coalition. Though Shapely value is a single imputation, it is based on fair divisions rather than bargaining considerations. So, we present a method to obtain a single imputation based on bargaining considerations.

Keywords: Cooperative game in characteristic function form; transferable utility; coalition; core; imputation; bargaining set; bargaining value; 91A05; 91A06; 91A12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198907001461

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