VERTICAL FORECLOSURE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE LONG RUN: FULL INTERCONNECTION QUALITY FORECLOSURE X SLEEPING PATENTS

César Mattos ()
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César Mattos: CERME, Department of Economics, Universidade de Brasília, Brazil

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2007, vol. 09, issue 03, 527-549

Abstract: No abstract received.

JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198907001588

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