DELEGATED MANAGEMENT IN DYNAMIC DUOPOLIES
Vladimir P. Petkov ()
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Vladimir P. Petkov: School of Economics and Finance, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2010, vol. 12, issue 02, 93-114
Abstract:
This paper studies the commitment value of delegation in a model of dynamic competition. We argue that separating ownership and control delivers an instantaneous first-mover advantage. Thus, delegation would enable an oligopolistic firm to increase its equilibrium profit relative to direct management. We focus on remuneration strategies that provide managers with intertemporal production incentives: future wages depend on current effort. Their composition and functional form are endogenously determined by the requirement for Markov perfection. For the case of linear-quadratic payoffs, we obtain a closed-form solution for the equilibrium wage strategies which is independent of industry structure.
Keywords: Strategic delegation; dynamic oligopoly; Markov-perfect equilibrium; L13; L21; C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:12:y:2010:i:02:n:s0219198910002544
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198910002544
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