LARGENESS OF THE CORE OFk-CONVEX SYMMETRIC GAMES

Amit K Biswas ()
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Amit K Biswas: Indian Statistical Institute, 110, Nelson Manickam Road, Aminjikarai, Chennai - 600 029, India

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2013, vol. 15, issue 04, 1-5

Abstract: A cooperative TU game is said to posses a large core as defined by Sharkey [1982] if for every acceptable vector there is a smaller core vector in the game. This paper is devoted to characterization(s) of largeness of the core of a subclass of games known ask-convex games (containing the convex games in casek = n). Thek-convex games were defined by Driessen [1988] because of the core structure they possess, which is the same as that of a suitably defined convex game. The main goal is to show that the totally balanced symmetrick-convex games possess a large core if and only if the game is convex.

Keywords: Nondecreasing allocation; totally balanced cover; marginal; k-convex; MSC90D; JELC71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198913400239

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