A SIMPLE AXIOMATIZATION OF THE EGALITARIAN SOLUTION

Ismail Saglam

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2014, vol. 16, issue 04, 1-7

Abstract: In this paper, we present a simple axiomatization of then-person egalitarian solution. The single condition sufficient for characterization is a new axiom, calledsymmetric decomposabilitythat combines the axioms ofstep-by-step negotiations,symmetry, andweak Pareto optimalityused in an early characterization by Kalai [(1977) Proportional solutions to bargaining situations: Interpersonal utility comparisons,Econometrica45, 1623–1630].

Keywords: Cooperative bargaining; egalitarian solution; C71; C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: A simple axiomatization of the egalitarian solution (2012)
Working Paper: A Simple Axiomatization of the Egalitarian Solution (2012)
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DOI: 10.1142/S021919891450008X

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