Stochastic Approach for Determining Stable Coalition Structure

Elena Parilina () and Artem Sedakov ()
Additional contact information
Artem Sedakov: Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, Saint Petersburg State University, Universitetskii Prospekt 35, Petergof, Saint Petersburg 198504, Russia

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2015, vol. 17, issue 04, 1-22

Abstract: In this paper, we study TU-games with coalition structure and propose an approach for determining a stable coalition structure solving a stochastic game of a special form. Using a Nash equilibrium in this game, we draw an analogy between the stable coalition structure and an absorbing state in a Markov chain. In addition, we consider a case of restricted coalitions assuming that not all coalitions are feasible and extend the definition of the stable coalition structure to this case.

Keywords: TU-game; stochastic game; stationary strategy; stable coalition structure; the Shapley value; feasible coalition; C71; C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198915500097
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:17:y:2015:i:04:n:s0219198915500097

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198915500097

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().