Experimental Gaming Comparison of Resource Allocation Rules in Case of Transferable Utilities

N. A. Korgin and V. O. Korepanov ()
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N. A. Korgin: V. A. Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences, 117997, 65 Profsoyuznaya Street, Moscow, Russia†Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, 123182 Moscow, Russia
V. O. Korepanov: V. A. Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences, 117997, 65 Profsoyuznaya Street, Moscow, Russia

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2017, vol. 19, issue 02, 1-11

Abstract: The present paper discusses the comparative analysis results of resource allocation rules using experiments in the form of business games. The comparative analysis involves five rules. The resource allocation mechanism that gives the efficient solution of the problem without transferable utility, implementing it as dominant strategy equilibrium in the agents game, so called Uniform rule. The mechanism with balanced payments introduced earlier by authors using the Groves Ledyard rule that gives the efficient solution of the problem as a Nash equilibrium in the agents game, as well as its modification reducing the dimension of the action space of the agents. The mechanism from the class of proportional allocation mechanisms, where, the efficient resource allocation also represents a Nash equilibrium, but the payments are unbalanced. Last mechanism in the comparative analysis was originally developed as a distributed optimization algorithm.

Keywords: Resource allocation; Dominant strategy implementation; Nash implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198917500062

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